Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a sharp decline in global inflation, growth and interest rate. From 1981 to 2014, global financial uncertainty forecasts 18.26% and 14.95% of the variation in global growth and global inflation, respectively. Global uncertainty shocks exhibit more protracted, statistically significant and substantial effects on the global growth, inflation and interest rate than U.S. uncertainty shocks. U.S. uncertainty lags global uncertainty by one month. When controlling for domestic uncertainty, the decline in output following a rise in global uncertainty is statistically significant in each country, with the exception of the decline for China. The effects for the U.S. and China are also relatively small. For most economies, a positive shock to global uncertainty has a depressing effect on prices and official interest rates -exceptions are Brazil, Mexico and Russia, which represent economies with large capital outflows during financial crises. Decomposition of global uncertainty shocks shows that global financial uncertainty shocks are more important than non-financial shocks.
Introduction
The adverse impact of uncertainty on economic activity has received renewed interest following the influential study of Bloom (2009) . These investigations have analyzed the effect of country level uncertainty (usually U.S. uncertainty) on economic variables within a country, or alternatively, they have considered the impact of a measure of global uncertainty on economic variables within a country. 1 The rapid and accelerating process of financial globalization and new technologies prompts the question as to whether it is useful for economic uncertainty to be addressed as a global phenomenon, whose effects are examined for the global economy with either a country-specific occurrence or a global occurrence examined for country-specific effects.
In this study, we aim to answer the following questions: How does global uncertainty affect the global economy? Do global uncertainty shocks have different effects than U.S.
uncertainty shocks on the global economy? How do large developed and developing economies respond to global uncertainty shocks? Does the source of uncertainty shock matter for the global economy? To answer these questions, we developed an index of global uncertainty using the first principal component of the stock market volatility of the largest 15 economies. 2 We also evaluated the impact of global uncertainty on global interest rate, inflation and industrial production using the new global database from Global Economic Indicators (DGEI), Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. Gilchrist et al. (2010) , Knotek and Khan (2011), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) , Bekaert et al. (2013) , Bachmann et al. (2013) , Leduc and Liu (2015) , Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2014) and Jurado et al. (2015) . 2 Note that Bloom et al. (2007) show that share-return volatility is significantly correlated with alternative measures of uncertainty proxies. 3 The methodology underlying the Global Economic Indicators (DGEI) database is provided in Grossman et al. (2014) .
errors for nine industrialized countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Delrio (2016) assumes that the spread between each country's interbank rate and the federal funds rate is a measure of relative riskiness. This variable is then interacted with global uncertainty given by the realized volatility of daily MSCI World Index returns over calendar quarters. Hirata et al. (2012) find that global house prices are synchronized and that global uncertainty shocks seem to be important in explaining fluctuations in global house prices. As in Bloom (2009) , uncertainty is given by the volatility of daily equity prices of the G-7. Ozturk and Sheng (2016) construct a monthly measure of global uncertainty as the PPP-weighted average of the country-specific uncertainties for a dataset of forecast data for 46 advanced and emerging market economies. Leduc and Liu (2015) examine the effects of uncertainty -which are measured by
Michigan Survey results on the fraction of respondents reporting that an "uncertain future"
makes it a bad time to buy cars or durable goods over the next 12 months -on the U.S. unemployment rate. Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2014) estimate the impact of U.S. GDP growth volatility shocks on the UK in a structural VAR model with time-varying volatility.
In this study, we build on the methodology of Bloom (2009) to construct a global uncertainty index using the first principal component of stock market volatility of 15 major developed and developing economies. It provides a forward-looking indicator that is implicitly weighted in accordance with the impact of different sources of uncertainty across major countries in the world on equity value. Our measure of global uncertainty captures important political, war, financial and economic events over the period 1981 to 2014 and shows high correlations with alternative measures based on the methodology of Jurado et al. (2015) and Ozturk and Sheng (2016) .
The results show that global uncertainty shocks are less frequent than those observed in data on the U.S. economy. The global uncertainty shocks are associated with a sharp decline in global interest rate, inflation and industrial production. The maximum decline of global inflation and industrial production occurs six months after a global uncertainty shock, while the maximum decline in global interest rate occurs 16 months after a global uncertainty shock.
Our decomposition of global uncertainty shocks shows that global financial uncertainty shocks are more important than non-financial shocks. From 1981 to 2014, global financial uncertainty forecasts 18.26% and 14.95% of the variation in global growth and inflation, respectively. In contrast, the non-financial uncertainty forecasts only 7.75% and 2.15% of the This paper proceeds as follows. An index of global uncertainty is constructed in Section 2. The effect of global uncertainty on the global economy is modeled in Section 3. In Section 4, preliminary results are examined with a FAVAR model. Section 5 compares the differences between the U.S. and global uncertainty shocks. Section 6 examines the effects of global uncertainty decomposed into financial and non-financial origins. The effect of global uncertainty on individual major economies when controlling for local uncertainty is evaluated in section 7. Section 8 provides robustness analysis, and Section 9 concludes.
2. An index of global uncertainty
Methodology
Empirical literature on economic uncertainty has utilized the variability of stock market returns and firm profitability to provide a measure of uncertainty that can influence economic and financial variables. In this study, we build upon this methodology by constructing a global uncertainty index given by the first principal component of stock market volatility of the largest 15 economies. 5 It provides a forward-looking indicator that is implicitly weighted in accordance with the impact of different sources of uncertainty across major countries in the world on equity value.
Let , be the difference of the natural log of the stock market index of country :
where denotes the average monthly stock price for a given country at time , with = 1,2 … , . Let
where is the stock market volatility of country at time , ̅ , is the sample average of , . The stock market volatility index is then estimated for the largest 15 economies in 2013 according to the gross domestic product (based on purchase power parity). 
Global and the U.S. uncertainty indices
In Figures 1 and 2 , we show the global uncertainty index developed in Equation (1) On Monday, October 19, 1987, stock markets around the world collapsed. The fall started in Hong Kong and spread west to Europe; in the United States, the Dow Jones Industrial 7 Data from the stock market are not available for all countries from 1981. The index is constructed with data on the countries for which data are available. A shortcoming of this approach is that for the earlier period, missing data are more apparent for developing countries. Nevertheless, we argue that this is not necessarily a problem, given that in the first part of the sample (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , the relative weight of developed economies in the global economy is more important than in the more recent period (following China's unprecedented growth starting in mid-1990s). The availability of stock market data for each country is reported in Table A1 in Appendix A. 8 The last is just the stock market volatility index constructed with only the data for the U.S. stock market. The GFC includes several events described in detail in Table A3 In Figure 3 , the global and U.S. volatility indices are scaled so that the mean volatilities are equal. The following structural VAR model of order is utilized:
) is a ( = 4) × 1 vector of endogenous variables, 0 denotes the 4 × 4 contemporaneous coefficient matrix, 0 represents a 4x1
vector of constant terms, refers to the 4 × 4 autoregressive coefficient matrices and stands for a 4 × 1 vector of structural disturbances. 9 To construct the structural VAR model representation, the reduced-form VAR model is consistently estimated using the least-squares method and is obtained by multiplying both sides of Equation (4) The structural shocks to the dynamic responses of an endogenous variable are then identified using a Cholesky decomposition.
Data and global macroeconomic variables
The data for both the global uncertainty index and the VAR models are monthly and extend from January 1981 to December 2014. Before 1981, data are not available for most variables from many developing countries. Data descriptions, sources and period availabilities are presented in Table A2 .
The global factors , and are estimated using data on emerging economies, advanced economies (excluding the U.S.) and the U.S. The data on interest rate, CPI and industrial production are taken from DGEI, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, for the G40 countries. In DGEI, weights (based on shares of world GDP [PPP] ) are applied to the official/policy interest rates (determined by central banks) in levels and are applied to the indexes for industrial production and headline price indexes in growth rates to construct indices for emerging economies and advanced economies (excluding the U.S). In 2014, on a GDP PPP basis, the G40 economies account for 83% of the global GDP. Also, within the G40, the U.S., 19 advanced economies (excluding the U.S.) and 20 emerging economies account for 18%, 25%, and 40%, respectively, of the global GDP. Combined, the 20 largest emerging economies on a PPP basis are now nearly as large as the 20 largest developed economies. , and are the leading principal components:
where the superscripts US, Ad and Em represent the United States, advanced economies (excluding the U.S) and emerging economies. 
The FAVAR model results
The reduced-form VAR model of Equation (4) is consistently estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. We utilize the resulting estimates to construct the structural VAR representation of the model. The dynamic effect is examined by the impulse responses of global output growth, inflation and interest rate to the structural global uncertainty shock. We present the responses to one-time global uncertainty shocks as well as to the historical episodes of the uncertainty shocks. 11 We deal with missing data in early observations for some series by building the factors with series available at this time to maximise the number of time series observations. Figure 4 shows the impact of one standard deviation of the global uncertainty shocks on global industrial production growth, global CPI inflation and global interest rate for the FAVAR estimation. The dashed lines represent a one-standard-error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions. We utilize the impulse response functions in Figure 4 to assess the timing and magnitude of the responses to a onetime global uncertainty shock in the economy.
The effects of global uncertainty shocks on the economy
On the left hand side of Figure 4 , the estimated lags in the VAR system are indicated.
The FAVAR model is estimated with 3, 6 and 12 lags. The second, third and fourth columns in Figure 4 show responses of global interest rate, CPI inflation and industrial production growth to global uncertainty shocks. The results are summarized as follows:
 Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global industrial production growth, which is greatest after 4 to 8 months depending on the specification.
 Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global CPI, reaching the greatest point of decline after 6 months. However, when 12 lags are used in the VAR system, the greatest point of decline occurs after 10 months.
 Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a decline in global interest rate; when 3-and 6-month lags are used in the VAR systems, the greatest decline in the global interest rate is observed after 16 months.
12
12 When the models are specified with 12 lags, the greatest response occurs after 6 months, with a quick return to positive values after 12 months. This pattern is only observed for FAVAR model, and for the FABVAR model, Wishart type of priors in models with a 12-month lag. Even with a 12-month lag structure, the FABVAR model with Minnesota and Sims-Zha priors gives results that are similar to those obtained in the FAVAR and FABVAR models with 3-month and 6-month lags.
Does the global economy respond differently to global uncertainty shocks compared to U.S. uncertainty shocks?
Given that the U.S. is the world's largest financial centre, we disaggregate the effects of U.S. uncertainty ( ) and global uncertainty. U.S. uncertainty is estimated as a volatility index of the U.S. stock market. The new vector of endogenous variables is a ( = 5) × 1 vector of endogenous variables: 
where represents the U.S uncertainty shock derived from the volatility of the U.S. stock market. Note that coefficient 44 is set to be zero; this implies that we do not have a preference for ordering either the U.S. or global uncertainty first in the Cholesky decomposition.
13 Figure 5 shows the responses of global industrial production, CPI and interest rate to global (first row) and U.S. (second row) uncertainty shocks. In the first column, a one-standarddeviation shock to global uncertainty decreases global industrial production by -0.13. and a one-standard-deviation shock to U.S. uncertainty reduces global industrial production by less than -0.06. The global uncertainty shock is statistically significant over a more extended period of time. The global and U.S. uncertainty shocks are statistically significant over 1 to 16 months and 1 to 10 months, respectively. The impact of global and U.S uncertainty shocks also differ in their effects on global CPI. While the response of global CPI to global uncertainty shocks is statistically significant and reaches a minimum of -0.08, the impact of U.S. uncertainty shocks on global CPI is much smaller and is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Finally, the global interest rate is negatively affected by a positive global uncertainty shock, but the effect is only marginally statistically significant. The response of global interest rate to U.S uncertainty shocks is much smaller and is not statistically significant.
Does the source of uncertainty shocks matter for the global economy?
The central result in Section 4.2 is that the global uncertainty shocks have very different effects on the economy at different points in time. In this section, we show that global uncertainty shocks have different sources. We analyse the impact of global uncertainty shocks looking at their sources. In particular, we decompose global uncertainty shocks into global financial and non-financial shocks, where the shocks considered are those shocks that exceed 1.65 standard deviations in terms of monthly observations.
Financial vs. non-financial uncertainty shock
In this subsection, we distinguish between financial and non-financial shocks and estimate the impact effects of both shocks on the global economy. Shocks originating in economic or financial disruption may have been amenable to better economic policy design, whereas those due to war or terrorism are not (although political policies might have an impact).
Examination of uncertainty shocks with an economic/financial source might lead to a better understanding of how economic policy might be designed to both avoid and mitigate the effects of future shocks.
Our definition of global financial shocks comprises the following events that exceeded 1.65 standard deviations: Black Monday, Russian Default, WorldCom and the GFC. The global financial crisis includes the five main events described in Table A3 To disaggregate global uncertainty shocks, we modify the system of equations by subtitling the unique variable into two different uncertainty shocks (i.e., * and * ), where the first variable the global financial uncertainty shock is constructed by interacting the index with a dummy variable , which takes the value of 1 when a financial shock occurs and 0 otherwise. Details of the period dummies can be found in Appendix A, Table A4 . 
We set 44 to be zero, since there is no good reason to impose an order on financial and nonfinancial uncertainty.
16
14 The dummy variables only take the value of 1 when the identified shock exceeds 1.65 standard deviations following Bloom (2009) . 15 We slightly innovate with respect of Bloom (2009) , who uses only a single dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the uncertainty shock occurs and 0 otherwise. The reason for doing that is because Bloom (2009)'s definition does not capture the magnitude of the shock. By interacting the and a dummy variable, the shocks now also capture the dimension of the shock. 16 Either eliminating the zero restriction on 44 and/or changing the order financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks do not alter the main results. Figure 6 compares the impacts of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks on key global macroeconomic variables. In the first and second rows, we show the impact of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks (respectively) on global industrial production (first column), CPI (second column) and interest rate (third column).
Results in the first column suggest that financial uncertainty shocks have a much larger impact in absolute value than the non-financial shocks in reducing global industrial production (up to -0.17 and -0.10, respectively). Also, the impact of financial shocks on global industrial production is faster. The greatest impact of financial shocks on global industrial production is observed between 6 to 10 months later compared to 11 to 16 months later for non-financial shocks. The differences between the responses of Global CPI to those shocks are remarkable.
Financial uncertainty shocks have a negative effect on global CPI, which is statistically significant at conventional levels. By contrast, non-financial shocks do not have a statistically significant effect on global CPI. The third column of Figure 6 shows that central banks eventually reduce interest rates by similar amounts after both financial and non-financial shocks. At the 48-month horizon, global financial uncertainty accounts for 18.26% and 14.95% of the variation in global growth and inflation, respectively.
Variance decomposition of global macroeconomic variables to financial and nonfinancial uncertainty shocks

Effect of global uncertainty in presence of local uncertainty for domestic economies
To determine whether the effect of global uncertainty on local macroeconomic variables is robust to the inclusion of local uncertainty, we re-estimate the SVAR for the largest developed and developing economies with both global and domestic uncertainty included as variables. The models are estimated separately for each economy.
The model is described in Equation 10
, where the first four variables in the SVAR system are variables for a specific economy and the last variable is global uncertainty. The endogenous variables in the model can be summarized as follows:
where is the domestic industrial production, is the domestic CPI, is the domestic interest rate set by the central bank, is domestic uncertainty which is the volatility index of the domestic stock market, and is global uncertainty as described in previous models. The period estimated extends from January 1981 to December 2014, and data definitions, sources and period availabilities are presented in Table A5 . 17 The Cholesky lower triangle contemporaneous matrix is estimated using the following 0 matrix: 
Results for the impulse responses of domestic output, inflation and interest rate appear in Figures 7a and 7b for the largest developed and developing economies, respectively. Output declines significantly in each country with a rise in global uncertainty, even controlling for domestic uncertainty. The only exception is China, where the effect is negative but not statistically significant. The U.S. output is less affected by global uncertainty than the output of the other countries (with the exception of China). China's economy may be less affected by global uncertainty, since China is less integrated into the world economy than other countries.
The U.S. may be less affected by global uncertainty because of the size of its economy.
The output of countries significantly affected by shocks to global uncertainty include commodity dependant countries (Brazil and Russia), major advanced countries (France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK) and important emerging countries (India, Mexico and South Africa). The negative effect of global uncertainty on domestic output does not persist for as 17 The starting period for these estimations starts later than 1981 for some countries due to data availability. In particular, the starting period for Brazil is October 1996, January 1994 for China, January 1994 for India, January 1997 for Russia and January 1990 for South Africa. For all other countries, the full period sample is available from January 1981 to December 2014. long in Japan as for most other countries, possibly due to relatively high levels of economic association with China's economy.
The responses of inflation and the official interest to positive shocks to global uncertainty are mostly negative and consistent with the result for the negative effect of shocks to global uncertainty on output. For most economies, a positive shock to global uncertainty has a depressing effect on output and prices, and central banks respond with a reduction in the official interest rate. Exceptions include Brazil, Mexico and Russia.
For Brazil, Mexico and Russia, while an increase in global uncertainty is associated with depressed domestic output, the CPI and interest rate increased. In periods of high global uncertainty (e.g., a global financial crisis), large capital outflows take place in these economies and trigger higher inflation. As a consequence, the interest rate also increases to reduce capital outflows. Shaghil and Zlate (2013) 
Robustness analysis
We perform several robustness analyses. In Supplementary material 1, we reproduce all estimations from the previous section using a Factor Augmented Bayesian Vector Overall, these results are robust to the findings of the FAVAR model. Figure B1 shows the impact of one-standard-deviation global uncertainty shocks on global industrial production growth, CPI inflation and interest rate for the FABVAR model, with vector of endogenous variables = (∆( ), ∆( ), , ). The model is estimated with 3, 6 and 12 lags, as indicated on the left hand side of Figure B1 . Each column in Figure B1 shows the response of global interest rate, CPI inflation and industrial production growth to global uncertainty shocks. The timing and magnitude of the responses to a one-time global uncertainty shock in the economy in Figure B1 are very similar to the results in Figure   4 from the FAVAR model.
The effects of global uncertainty shocks on the economy in the FABVAR model
In brief, global uncertainty shocks are accompanied by a quick decline in global industrial production growth that is most severe after 4 to 8 months. Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global CPI, reaching the greatest levels of decline after 6 to 12 months, depending on the number of lags and the prior adopted. Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a decline in global interest rate that persists with the greatest decline in the global interest rate observed over 16 to 20 months. The only exception to the latter results for the impact of global uncertainty on the global interest rate is for the FABVAR model with Sims-Zha prior, for which the decline in interest rate is greatest after 7 or 8 months and is reversed after 10 months.
Effects of global uncertainty and U.S. uncertainty shocks in the FABVAR model
The and interest rate to global uncertainty shocks.
Financial vs. non-financial uncertainty shock in the FABVAR model
The impacts of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks on the global macroeconomic variables estimated from the FABVAR model are presented in Figure B3 
Effects of global uncertainty on domestic economies in the FABVAR model
Results for the impulse responses of domestic output, inflation and interest rate for the largest economies from the FABVAR model appear in Figures B4 and B5 Brazil, Mexico and Russia, an increase in global uncertainty is associated with increases in the official interest rate, and for Mexico and Russia, an increase in global uncertainty is associated with increases the official interest.
Ordering of variables
To accomplish an additional robustness check, we provided FAVAR models using a reverse ordering of variables in the Cholesky-VAR system, as proposed by Bloom (2009); these models can be found in the supplementary material section. These results confirm the sign and statistical significance of the results from the main models estimated in the text.
Alternative measure of global uncertainty
In this section, we explore the use of three alternative measures of global uncertainty.
The first alternative measure proposed is the GDP-weighted index of country specific volatility (also for the largest 15 economies). For this alternative measure, we weight each country of the 15 largest economies using GDP Purchase Power Parity (PPP) in U.S. dollars as reported by the Wold Bank. The main drawback of this measure is that the intertemporal change in weights can only be incorporated annually as this data is only available on an annual basis from the World Bank.
A second alternative measure considered is for the largest 20 economies (rather than 15 economies) using the principal component analysis described in Equations 1 to 3. The additional countries included in this measure are Indonesia, Iran, Thailand, Nigeria and Poland.
The stock market data for these countries is only available for a shorter span (generally from the 1990s), and therefore the inclusion of these five countries only change the benchmark measure of global uncertainty from 1990.
The third alternative measure is based on the notion from Jurado et al. (2015) that uncertainty can be defined as the unforecastable component of a linear regression. In the spirit of this definition, we consider the residual of the following equation as a measure of global uncertainty:
where is the global uncertainty index from Equation 1 to 3, +1 is the same index at time +1 and is considered the optimal forecast under the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and is the residual or uncertainty measure.
18 Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients of alternative measures of global uncertainty. The correlations are very high amongst these four measures, ranging from 0.98 to 0.94. In results available from the authors, we show that either measure of global uncertainty leads to very similar results in both the FAVAR and FABVAR models.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the impact of global uncertainty on the global economy and Notes: The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980) , where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient. Note that to conserve space we only report results when 6 lags are specified in the FAVAR system. Results for 3 and 12 lags are available from the authors upon request.
Figure 7a. Responses of large developed economies to global uncertainty shocks
Notes: The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980) , where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient.
Response of Domestic Output
Response of Domestic CPI Response Domestic IR
Figure 7b. Responses of large developing economies to global uncertainty shocks
Notes: The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980) , where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient. The U.S. government took control of AIG. The U.S. The federal government to take control of the company and guarantee to loan it up to $85 billion. ] .
The posterior density is
where the posterior mean ̅ is:
We utilize a Minnesota prior that involves setting the elements of 0 to be zero to ensure shrinkage of the VAR coefficients toward zero and reduce the over-fitting risk. It assumes the prior covariance matrix V to be diagonal, in the sense that own lags of endogenous variables are more likely to be important predictors than lags of other variables. The error variance-covariance matrix is the standard OLS estimate of the error terms Σ = / .
Alternatively, we estimate the FABVAR model using two different non-informative priors, in that the Minnesota prior ignores any uncertainty in the elements of error variancecovariance matrix . The first is the natural conjugate prior that treats as an unknown parameter, Notes: To conserve space we only report results when 6 lags are specified in the FABVAR system. Results for 3 and 12 lags are available from the authors upon request.
Figure B3. FABVAR model: Responses of global variables to financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks
Notes: To conserve space we only report results when 6 lags are specified in the FABVAR system. Results for 3 and 12 lags are available from the authors upon request.
Uncertainty
Response of GIP to GU Shocks
Response of GCPI to GU Response GIR to GU Figure B1 . Each column in Figure B1 shows the response of global interest rate, global CPI inflation and global industrial production growth to global uncertainty shocks. The timing and magnitude of the responses to a one-time global uncertainty shock in the economy in Figure B1 are very similar to the results in Figure 4 from the FAVAR model.
In brief, global uncertainty shocks are accompany a quick decline in global industrial production growth that is most severe after 4 to 8 months. Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global CPI reaching the greatest levels of decline after 6 to 12 months, depending on the number of lags and the prior adopted. Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a decline in global interest rate that persists, with the greatest decline in the global interest rate observed over 16 to 20 months. The only exception to the latter results for the impact of global uncertainty on the global interest rate is for the FABVAR model with Sims-Zha prior, for which case the decline in interest rate is greatest after 7 or 8 months and is reversed after 10 months.
Effects of global uncertainty and U.S. uncertainty shocks in the FABVAR model
The effects of global uncertainty and U.S. uncertainty shocks on the variables in the For Brazil, Mexico and Russia, an increase in global uncertainty is associated with increases the official interest rate, and Mexico and Russia an increase in global uncertainty is associated with increases the official interest.
